Abstract. In this work, we take a closer look at anonymity and robustness in encryption schemes. Roughly speaking, an anonymous encryption scheme hides the identity of the secret-key holder, while a robust encryption scheme guarantees that every ciphertext can only be decrypted to a valid plaintext under the intended recipient's secret key. In case of anonymous encryption, we show that if an anonymous PKE or IBE scheme (in presence of CCA attacks) is used in a hybrid encryption, all bets regarding the anonymity of the resulting encryption are off. We show that this is the case even if the symmetric-key component is anonymous. On the positive side, however, we prove that if the keyencapsulation method is, additionally weakly robust the resulting hybrid encryption remains anonymous. Some of the existing anonymous encryption schemes are known to be weakly robust which makes them more desirable in practice. In case of robust encryption, we design several efficient constructions for transforming any PKE/IBE scheme into weakly and strongly robust ones. Our constructions only add a minor computational overhead to the original schemes, while achieving better ciphertext sizes compared to the previous constructions. An important property of our transformations is that they are non-keyed and do not require any modifications to the public parameters of the original schemes. We also introduce a relaxation of the notion of robustness we call collisionfreeness. We primarily use collision-freeness as an intermediate notion by showing a more efficient construction for transforming any collision-free encryption scheme into a strongly robust one. We believe that this simple notion can be a plausible replacement for robustness in some scenarios in practice. The advantage is that most existing schemes seem to satisfy collision-freeness without any modifications.
Introduction
The classical definitions of security for encryption schemes are mainly concerned with the secrecy of encrypted data. Particularly, the widely accepted notions of indistinguishability and non-malleability under chosen plaintext and ciphertext attacks [15, 19, 12] , are all directed at capturing various aspects of data-secrecy in encryption schemes. However, since encryption schemes are employed in a wide range of applications, one often requires them to satisfy additional properties.
Two such properties, which have been the subject of formal studies in the cryptographic literature, are anonymity [5, 2] and robustness [3] . Anonymity helps keep the identity of the key-holders in an encryption scheme private, while robustness provides a layer of protection against misuse or error by ensuring that a single ciphertext can only be decrypted by the intended user. In this paper we study several aspects of anonymity and robustness in public-key and identity-based encryption schemes.
Anonymity of Hybrid Encryption Schemes
The concept of anonymity for encryption schemes has been around for sometime but was first formalized in the context of symmetric-key encryption [1, 11, 14] and was later extended to the case of public-key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE) [5, 2] . Several PKE and IBE schemes in the literature such as the Cramer-Shoup [10] , and the Boyen-Waters [9] in the standard model, and DHIES [4] and Boneh-Franklin [8] in the random oracle model are shown to be anonymous.
However, in most cases, PKE and IBE schemes are used as key encapsulation methods (KEM) to encrypt a random key which is then used by a symmetric-key data encapsulation method (DEM) to encrypt the message itself. It is well known that if the KEM component is IND-CCA secure and the DEM component is (onetime) IND-CCA, the resulting hybrid encryption is also IND-CCA secure (e.g. see [10] ).
1 From a practical point of view, it is important to determine whether similar statements can be made when considering anonymity.
A negative result. At first glance, it seems that the symmetric-key component is harmless as far as anonymity is concerned since it only encrypts a message using a random secret key, which is unlikely to reveal additional information about the public key or the identity (this is in fact the case for CPA attacks). However, somewhat surprisingly, we show that this intuition is wrong in presence of chosen ciphertext attacks. Particularly, we show a counterexample by building an anonymous-CCA (ANON-CCA) secure PKE/IBE scheme and a symmetric-key IND-CCA encryption, where it is easy to break the anonymity of the resulting hybrid construction. The negative result extends to the case when the symmetric-key component is also anonymous. An important implication is that:
Designing ANON-CCA PKE or IBE schemes is not sufficient for providing anonymity in practice where, more often than not, encryption schemes are used in hybrid constructions.
A positive result. On the positive side, we show that if one further assumes that the KEM component is weakly-robust (see Section 2 for the definition), the resulting hybrid encryption is in fact ANON-CCA. This implies that despite our negative result, for most ANON-CCA schemes we know of such as the BonehFranklin IBE, the Cramer-Shoup PKE, and the DHIES PKE all of which are known to be weakly-robust [3] (in the appropriate model), using them as part of a hybrid construction preserves their anonymity. The same is however not true for the Boyen-Waters anonymous IBE scheme which is shown not to be weakly robust.
This result reemphasizes the close connection between anonymity and robustness and provides additional motivation to study the robustness property when designing anonymous encryption schemes.
Robustness
Informally speaking, weak robustness requires that a ciphertext does not decrypt to a valid plaintext under distinct secret keys for two different identities. A stronger version of robustness requires this to be the case even for adversarially chosen ciphertexts. The concept of robustness was studied in one way or another in [18] and [17] , but was only recently formalized by Abdalla et al. [3] .
It is not hard to see that robustness can be trivially achieved by appending the encryption key to the ciphertext and checking for it upon decryption. The main drawback is that the resulting scheme is no longer anonymous. In fact, as discussed in [3] and further motivated by our results on anonymity of hybrid encryptions, it is exactly for anonymous schemes that robustness is important. In [3] , the authors study the robustness properties for several existing anonymous encryption schemes, and design general constructions for transforming any IBE/PKE scheme into robust ones.
A transformation is keyed if an additional string needs to be added to the set of public parameters for the original scheme, and is called non-keyed, otherwise. An important advantage of non-keyed constructions over keyed ones is that the robustness property can be added to the encryption scheme without having to notify a third party such as a PKI in advance. Consequently, users of a system can add robustness to the scheme after it is deployed.
Non-keyed transformations for robustness. In the standard model, we design a non-keyed construction for transforming any anonymous IBE/PKE scheme into a weakly robust one in presence of CPA attacks. In the random oracle model, we design a non-keyed transformation that provides strong robustness in presence of CCA attacks. In both cases, the computational overhead is very small (it involves one to three invocations of a hash function), and despite being non-keyed the ciphertext sizes we achieve are better than those of the previous work. A curious open question is whether we can achieve the latter transformation in the standard model.
Collision-freeness.
We also study the notion of collision-freeness, a natural relaxation of robustness. Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is collisionfree if a ciphertext does not decrypt to the same message under two different decryption keys. Collision-freeness can be a sufficient property in some scenarios in practice. For example, if the receiver expects to see a specific message as part of the protocol but after decrypting using his secret key recovers a different one, he can detect an error and stop the communication. Interestingly, we show that schemes such as the El Gamal PKE scheme [13] and the Boyen-Waters IBE scheme [9] are strongly collision-free even though they are known not to be weakly robust. Hence, collision-freeness seems to be a less restrictive assumption on an encryption scheme and one that most encryption schemes seem to satisfy without any modifications. More importantly, we design a more efficient construction for transforming any collision-free encryption scheme to a strongly robust one.
Preliminaries
One-way functions. Roughly speaking, a function is one-way if it is hard to invert on a random input. More formally, we say that a function f over {0, 1}
is negligible for every PPT inverter A.
general encryption schemes. Abdalla et al. [3] introduced and used the notion of general encryption schemes which encompass both PKE and IBE schemes. Similar to their work we will use this notion, since all our transformations are applicable to both PKE and IBE schemes. A general encryption (GE) scheme consists of a tuple GE = (Pg, Kg, Enc, Dec) of algorithms. The parameters generation algorithm Pg takes no input and returns common parameters pars and a master secret key msk. On input pars, msk, id, the key generation algorithm Kg produces an encryption key ek and the decryption key dk. On inputs pars, ek, M the encryption algorithm Enc produces a ciphertext C encrypting plaintext M . On input pars, ek, dk, C, the deterministic decryption algorithm Dec returns either a plaintext M or ⊥ to indicate that it rejects. GE is a PKE scheme if msk = ϵ and Kg ignores its id input. GE is an IBE scheme if ek = id, meaning the encryption key generated by Kg on inputs pars, msk, id is always id. Finally, we point out that the notion of general encryption contains PKE schemes, IBE schemes and more. In other words, there are general encryption schemes that are neither PKE nor IBE schemes.
AI-{CPA,CCA} security. Traditionally, the definitions of privacy [15, 19, 12] and anonymity [5, 2] for encryption schemes are introduced separately. However, when considering robustness, it makes sense to consider both notions simultaneously. Hence we follow the definition of [3] who combine the two into a single game. We define the AI-{CPA,CCA} security (AI = ANON + IND) of a general encryption scheme GE = (Pg, Kg, Enc, Dec) via a security game between the adversary and the challenger. • Decryption-key query id.
Note that there is only one challenge query. In case of CPA attacks, no decryption queries are allowed. Adversary A's advantage in the AI-{CPA,CCA} game is:
In some cases however, we consider the security notions for anonymity (ANON-{CPA,CCA}) and indistinguishability (IND-{CPA,CCA}), individually. The challenge query in the above security game can be modified in the obvious way to capture each of these definitions separately. We point out that similar definitions can also be adapted for the case of symmetric-key encryption.
Robustness. Following [3] , we consider two definitions of robustness for a general encryption scheme, namely weak robustness (WROB) and strong robustness (SROB). The following game defines both notions. As noted below the only difference is in the final message sent by the adversary to the challenger:
• Public key query id.
In the WROB game the adversary produces a message M , and C is its encryption under the encryption key of one of the given identities, while in the SROB game adversary produces C directly, and may not obtain it as an honest encryption. Note that in case of PKE schemes, the adversary does not get to choose the encryption keys of the identities it is targeting. Those are honestly and independently chosen by the identities themselves in real life and and by the games in the above formalizations.
Anonymous-CCA Hybrid Encryption
In this section we take a closer look at anonymous encryption schemes in presence of chosen ciphertext attacks (ANON-CCA) as defined in Section 2. Previous works on anonymous public-key and identity-based encryption [5, 2] have studied this security notion and provided constructions satisfying it.
However, in most scenarios in practice, PKE and IBE schemes are used in the KEM/DEM paradigm. It is known that if the KEM component is IND-CCA secure and the DEM component is (one-time) IND-CCA, the resulting hybrid encryption is also IND-CCA secure. For practical reasons, it is crucial to determine whether we can make similar statements when considering the anonymity of the resulting hybrid construction. More specifically, we try to answer the following question:
Given
an ANON-CCA PKE or IBE scheme and an (ANON-CCA + IND-CCA) symmetric-key encryption scheme, is the resulting hybrid encryption scheme ANON-CCA?

A Negative Result
Somewhat surprisingly, we answer the above question in the negative. First we show a counterexample by building an ANON-CCA secure PKE/IBE scheme and a symmetric-key IND-CCA encryption, where it is easy to break the anonymity of the resulting hybrid construction. The negative result easily extends to the case when the symmetric-key component is also ANON-CCA. An important implication is that designing ANON-CCA PKE or IBE schemes is not sufficient for providing anonymity in practice where, more often than not, encryption schemes are used in hybrid constructions.
Claim 31 There exist an ANON-CCA PKE/IBE scheme and a symmetric-key authenticated encryption scheme (assuming there are secure schemes at all) such that the resulting hybrid encryption is not ANON-CCA.
The intuition behind the counterexample is that since the adversary has access to a decryption oracle, he can take advantage of the fact that decrypting one ciphertext under two different secret keys can result in different answers. Particularly, these different answers can be used by the adversary to compromise the anonymity of the scheme.
Proof. We describe the proof for the case of a PKE scheme, but an identical proof works for IBE schemes as well. Let PKE 1 = (Kg 1 , Enc 1 , Dec 1 ) be an (ANON-CCA + WROB-CCA) PKE encryption scheme. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme or any of the constructions in this paper will do. We build the encryption scheme PKE 2 = (Kg 2 , Enc 2 , Dec 2 ) by letting the key-generation and encryption algorithms be identical to those of PKE 1 , and modifying the decryption algorithm such that whenever the Dec 1 algorithm returns the symbol ⊥, the decryption algorithm Dec 2 returns 0 n instead, and otherwise works similar to Dec 1 . It is easy to verify that after this simple modification, PKE 2 remains ANON-CCA. PKE 2 will be the key encapsulation method in our counterexample.
For the DEM component we use an IND-CCA encryption scheme that is also key-binding, a notion introduced in [14] .
Definition 1. A symmetric-key encryption scheme E = (SK, SE, SD) is called key-binding if for any key
The key-binding property guarantees that a ciphertext created using one secret key, does not decrypt correctly under any other secret key. Fischlin [14] showed simple constructions of such encryption schemes from any PRF. For the purpose of our counterexample it suffices to know that an IND-CCA encryption scheme E with such a property exists. Now, we show that combining PKE 2 and E into a hybrid encryption is not ANON-CCA. Particularly, an attacker with the following simple strategy can break the anonymity of the scheme.
Recall the ANON-CCA security game. Attacker A initially sends a message m as his challenge in the ANON-CCA game and receives the ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 ) = (Enc(pk id b , k), SE k (m)) for a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a random key k ∈ {0, 1} n . Then, A makes a decryption query for the ciphertext (c 1 , SE 0 n (m ′ )) under public key pk id0 , for an arbitrary message m ′ . If the answer is ⊥, A outputs 0 and else outputs 1.
To see why A breaks the ANON-CCA security of the encryption scheme note that if b = 1 then k ′ = Dec 2 (sk id1 , Enc 2 (pk id0 , k)) = 0 n given the way we have defined PKE 2 . Hence, we have that
Hence we have SD k (SE 0 n (m ′ )) = ⊥ due to the key-binding property of E and the fact that k ̸ = 0 n with all but negligible probability. Therefore, A guesses the bit b correctly with high probability.
A closer look at the above attack strategy reveals that a much weaker property than that of definition 1 for the symmetric-key scheme suffices for our argument to go through. In particular, we only need the key binding property to hold for a fixed message and a fixed secret key (m ′ and 0 n , respectively).
Strengthening the DEM component? One potential solution is to use a symmetric-key encryption scheme that possesses some additional properties.
Particularly, one natural question is whether using an anonymous-CCA symmetrickey encryption as the DEM component would yield an anonymous hybrid construction. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is also negative. It is easy to verify that the above negative result extends to work for any security notion considered for symmetric-key encryption, as long as that security notion can be achieved in conjunction with the key-binding property. In all such cases, the proof given above works without any significant changes. Anonymity of symmetric-key encryption schemes has been studied under the name key-hiding in [14] where the authors also design IND-CCA secure symmetric-key encryption schemes that are simultaneously key-hiding and keybinding. This leads to the following claim: 
A Positive Result
In light of the above negative results, it is natural to ask what additional property the KEM component should have in order to preserve its ANON-CCA security in a hybrid construction. We show that if one further assumes that the KEM component is weakly-robust, the resulting hybrid encryption is in fact ANON-CCA. This implies that despite the negative results we gave above, for most ANON-CCA schemes we know such as the Boneh-Franklin IBE, the CramerShoup PKE, and the DHIES PKE all of which are known to be weakly-robust [3] , using them as part of a hybrid construction is safe. The intuition behind the proof is that weak robustness ensures that the decryption algorithm behaves in a predictable way, when decrypting a ciphertext under two different secret keys, and this predictable behavior combines quite nicely with the security properties of an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme, namely, IND-CCA security and the ciphertext integrity (CTXT-INT).
In the following claim we prove a stronger result than what we need here by considering the notion of AI-CCA security which combines ANON-CCA security and IND-CCA security into one definition. The main reason is that we need this stronger claim in a following section. The proof for the case when one is only interested in ANON-CCA secure hybrid schemes is identical.
Claim 33 If the KEM component PKE of a hybrid construction is an (AI-CCA + WROB-CCA) general encryption, and E is a one-time authenticated symmetric encryption, then the resulting hybrid encryption PKE
′ is also an AI-CCA general encryption scheme.
Proof. We prove the above claim via a sequence of games. It is easy to see that the difference between the advantage of any adversary in these two games is bounded by the decryption error. For simplicity we assume that there is no decryption error and therefore 
Game 3. Similar to game 2 except that the challenger generates and uses a random key k ′ (instead of k * ) when encrypting the private-key component of the ciphertext for the challenge query.
The difference between the advantages of an adversary in games 2 and 3 is bounded by the AI-CCA security of the PKE scheme:
Game 4. We modify game 3 in two ways. First, for the challenge query, instead of encrypting the message m b , the challenger encrypts the constant message 0 k . Second, for decryption queries (c 1 , c 2 ) under pk id b where c 1 = c 1 * the challenger returns ⊥.
The probability of distinguishing the first change is bounded by the IND-CCA advantage of an adversary against the E scheme, while for second change, the probability is bounded by the advantage of an adversary playing the ciphertext integrity (CTXT-INT) game with E. Both the IND-CCA security and the CTXT-INT security are properties that are possessed by any authenticated encryption scheme.
Finally, it is easy to see that the adversary's view in game 4 is independent of the bit b and hence adversary's advantage in guessing b is exactly 1/2. Putting things together we have:
Having further motivated the study of robust encryption schemes, we next focus on efficient ways of transforming general encryption schemes into robust ones. As mentioned earlier, such a transformation is called a keyed transformation if an additional string is added to the original set of public parameters, and is called non-keyed otherwise. In Section 4.1, we design an efficient and non-keyed transformation for weakrobustness, in presence of CPA attacks (in the standard model). In Section 4.2, we design a non-keyed transformation for strong-robustness in presence of CCA attacks (in the random oracle model). Despite being non-keyed, our transformations have better ciphertext sizes compared to previous work. In other words, not adding an extra string to the public parameters does translate to larger ciphertexts (see the efficiency comparison sections).
A Transformation for AI-CPA Schemes
The following non-keyed construction takes any AI-CPA encryption scheme, and transforms it to a (AI-CPA + WROB-CPA) scheme.
Construction 41
Let PKE = (Pg, Kg, Enc, Dec) be a AI-CPA general encryption scheme, and let f be a one-way function over {0, 1} k . We construct the general encryption scheme
• Parameter Generation(Pg
• Key Generation(Kg ′ ): On input pars, msk, id, return (pk id , sk id ) $ ← Kg(pars, msk, id).
• Encryption(Enc ′ ): On input pars, pk id , m, generate a random r ∈ {0, 1} k and return (Enc(pars, pk id , m||r), f (r)).
• Decryption(Dec
Note that in construction 41, instead of a one-way function, we can also use a target collision-resistant (TCR) hash function (a universal one-way hash function). Particularly, it is easy to show that any TCR function that is sufficiently compressing is a good one-way function.
We will shortly prove the security of the above scheme, but first lets briefly study its efficiency. Efficiency comparison. To implement our scheme one can use a fixed-length cryptographic hash function h with output length of 128 bits (e.g. constructed by suitably modifying the output length of a hash function from the SHA family). The reason that we only need 128 bits of output is that we only require the hash function to be one-way as opposed to collision-resistant. Furthermore, it is sufficient for us to let k = 256 where r is chosen from {0, 1} k .
longer than the original message and the ciphertext is at most expanded by an additive factor of 384 bits as opposed to 768 bits in construction of Abdalla et al. [3] .
Theorem 1.
Let PKE be a AI-CPA secure general encryption scheme and f be a one-way function. Then, the PKE ′ scheme of construction 41 is both AI-CPA secure and WROB-CPA secure.
Proof. We prove the theorem in two separate claims. Claim 42 ensures that the above transformation preserves the AI-CPA security of the original scheme. Claim 43 states that the resulting scheme PKE ′ is also weakly robust.
Claim 42
For any PPT adversary A against PKE ′ , there exist a PPT adversary B against PKE such that:
Proof. B runs A. When A sends its challenge request (id 0 , id 1 
Proof. We prove this claim in a sequence of two games.
Game 0. Game 0 is the WROB-CPA game against the PKE ′ scheme as defined earlier. More specifically, adversary sends the tuple (id 0 , id 1 
the challenger outputs 1. Else it outputs 0. Game 1. Game 1 is similar to game 0, except that C 0 is computed in the following way:
The rest of the game stays the same. First we show that there exist an adversary B 1 such that Adv 
We now show that there exist an adversary B 2 such that Pr[G
. B 2 generates the (pars, msk) for the general encryption, and runs A. When B 2 receives the tuple (id 0 , id 1 , M ) he computes (pk id0 , sk id0 ), (pk id1 , sk id1 ) and C 0 = Enc(pars, pk id0 , M 0 ||0 k ). He then requests his challenge for the onewayness game and receives f (r) for a random r. B 2 then decrypts using (C 0 , f (r)) using the Dec ′ algorithm and the secret key sk id1 . If the result is ⊥ it outputs fail and halts. Else, it parses the decrypted plaintext into M ′ ||r ′ and returns r ′ to his own challenger. B 2 wins the one-wayness game if f (r ′ ) = f (r). Note that according to the definition of Dec ′ , whenever the decryption algorithm does not output ⊥ we have f (r ′ ) = f (r). Hence
Putting things together we have:
A Transformation for AI-CCA Schemes
Unfortunately, the transformation we gave above does not work in case of AI-CCA encryption schemes. Nevertheless, we are able to design an efficient and non-keyed transformation for any AI-CCA encryption scheme, in the random oracle model. The construction follows:
Construction 44 Let PKE = (Pg, Kg, Enc, Dec) be an AI-CCA general encryption scheme, and let G, H, H ′ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be three hash functions. We construct the general encryption scheme
• Parameter Generation(Pg ′ ): On input 1 k return (pars, msk)
• , r, m) ).
• Decryption(Dec ′ ): On inputs pars, pk id , sk id , (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , compute r
The above construction is an adaptation of an earlier version of the OAEP scheme (see [6] ) based on any one-way trapdoor function (TDF). The two main differences are that (i) we are transforming a randomized encryption scheme instead of a one-way TDF which is why we use H(r) to generate the randomness for the encryption algorithm, and (ii) since our goal is to also achieve robustness, the third component of the ciphertext hashes the public key along with the message and randomness.
It is also interesting to note that unlike the optimized OAEP scheme [7] which encrypts c 2 ||c 3 as part of the message (in order to obtain shorter ciphertexts), due to the impossibility result of [3] who rule out non-keyed redundancy codes, there is no hope of doing the same in our case. efficiency comparison. The overhead for the ciphertext size is two hash values each of which leads to 512 bits of overhead. The alternative existing solution would be to combine a weakly robust encryption scheme with the weak-to-strong transformation of [3] . This leads to 768 + x bits where the x is the ciphertext overhead of the weak-to-strong transformation which can be quite large itself (depending on the commitment scheme used). 
Theorem 2. Let
Proof. We prove this claim in a sequence of games. Game 0. In this game the adversary plays the AI-CCA game with the challenger using the construction above. A's view in the two games is different only in the case that he has not queried q to the list but is able to guess c 3 = H ′ (q). This only happens with probability 1/2 k for every decryption query. Hence
Game 2. This game is identical to game 1 except that if A makes an oracle query for H or G on input r where r is the random message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext, the challenger outputs f ail and ends the game.
Based on the fundamental lemma game playing we have
Next we will bound the probability of outputting fail, by the advantage of an adversary B who the one-way-CCA game against the PKE scheme. We show that for any adversary A winning the game G 2 , there exist a PPT adversary B winning the one-way-CCA game against the original scheme PKE. On an oracle query a (for any of the three oracles), if this is the ith oracle query, B outputs a to his own challenger and halts. Else, if a was queried before, he returns the same answer, and if not, he generates a random answer and adds the tuple to the corresponding list.
On a decryption query (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) where c 1 ̸ = c * 1 , B uses his own decryption oracle for Dec and performs the Dec ′ decryption algorithm. Here, it is critical for the randomness used in the encryption algorithm to be derivable from the decrypted message, and this is why H(·) is used as the randomness (or else B would not be able to perform the verification component of For any adversary A who makes an oracle query for the challenge random message, there is an adversary B ′ who does not make such a query and has a better advantage (since such a query does not help the adversary win)
Finally, given that B ′ does not query r to the oracle, the challenge ciphertext is completely independent of the challenge bit b and hence
